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A DICHOTOMY IN CONSUMER PROTECTION-THE DRUG-
DEVICE DEFINITION DILEMMA
RONALD L. STYNt
Each year the American public swallows enormous quantities of
tablets and capsules containing various drugs, is injected with innumer-
able gallons of serums and vaccines and applies countless tubes of creams
and salves to their bodies to treat and cure a wide variety of ills, both real
and imaginary. This quasi-religious reliance on drugs rests upon the
premise that drugs are useful in relieving discomfort or disease and are
harmless if used as directed despite occasional popular literature to the
contrary.'
Public confidence in drugs is based largely upon the belief that the
omniscient government would not permit the marketing of a drug that was
harmful or produced under less than the most sanitary conditions. This
attitude is encouraged by the existence of the new drug provisions of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which require that every new drug
must be proved safe and effective before it can be marketed.2 Unfortun-
ately, such provisions did not always exist,3 nor do any equivalent pro-
visions exist for pre-market clearance of medical devices.
PRE-MARKET CLEARANCE OF DRUGS
The Food and Drugs Act of 1906' contained no requirement that
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. Formerly Trial Attorney,
General Counsel's Office, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Food and Drug Division. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not
purport to reflect the views of the Food and Drug Administration.
1. See, e.g., M. KRETG, BLACK MARKET MEDICINE (1967); M. MIIITZ, THE
THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE (1965). When there was no federal regulation of food and
drugs, the most sensational muckraking literature was devoted primarily to unsanitary
conditions which prevailed in the preparation of foods, especially meat. E.g., U. SINCLAIR,
THE JUNGLE (1906) and Sinclair, Is Chicago's Meat Clean? COLLIER'S, April 22, 1905.
Even after the enactment of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, revolting conditions in the
manufacture of food continued to be a popular subject for muckrakers. E.g., W. LIP'-
SfANN, DRrFT AND MASTERY 7 (1914). Cf. the recent controversy over federal meat
inspection.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964).
3. See generally Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation,
1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1933).
4. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768.
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drugs be tested prior to being marketed. As early as 1917 recommenda-
tions were made to Congress to amend the existing law to correct this
defect.' In its earlier versions even the present Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act did not have a provision dealing with new drugs.' Only
after the "Elixer Sulfanilamide" disaster during September and October
of 1937 was a section proposed for the then pending Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act which would require pre-market clearance of new drugs.
The tragedy which underscored the need for pre-market testing of
drugs occurred when a large drug manufacturer in Tennessee, S.E. Mas-
sengil Company, decided to market a liquid preparation of sulfanilamide, a
valuable drug used to treat infections. Unfortunately, the company chose
diethylene glycol as a solvent. Even through diethylene glycol (a common
ingredient of antifreeze) may be dangerous when taken internally, the
company conducted no tests as to the toxicity of this product when used
as a solvent for sulfanilamide. The company's only criterion was that
sulfanilamide, which is insoluble in many liquids, would dissolve in
diethylene glycol. The preparation was distributed commercially for one
and one-half months before the company began recalling the product at
the insistence of the Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter FDA).
During the short time this preparation was on the market, seventy-three
persons died as a direct result of taking the drug. Twenty other persons
who took the elixer died, but it was not conclusively established that their
deaths were caused by the "elixer."
Public reaction to this calamity became so great that the Senate passed
a resolution that the incident be studied by the Department of Agriculture
and the cause of the disaster ascertained.7 In his report to Congress on
"Elixer Sulfanilamide,"' the Secretary of Agriculture emphasized the
shortcomings of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and pleaded for legisla-
tion that would prevent a repetition of the incident. Bills were introduced
in both houses of Congress requiring FDA approval before a new drug
could be marketed.' Although these bills were not enacted, their pro-
visions were incorporated into the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
5. See DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE CHEMIST 16 (1917).
6. See S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ; S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); and S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). For a
comprehensive collection of the legislative history of the Act see C. DUNN, Federal
FOOD, DRUG AND CoSmIETIC ACT-A STATEIENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD (1938).
7. S. Res. 194, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937).
8. Report of the Secretary of Agriculture on Deaths Due to Elixer Sulfanilimide,
S. Doc. No. 124, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), refrinted in DUNN, supra note 6, at
1316-27, and A. HERRICK & A. SMITH, NEw DRUGS 157-72 (1946).
9. S. 3073, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937) and H.R. 9341, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1937).
See generally 82 CONG. REC. 585 (1937) and 83 CONG. REC. 1682 (1938).
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of 19381° as sections 201 (p)'1 and 505.12
Under the present law before a "new drug" may be shipped in inter-
state commerce, a new drug application must be approved.' A "new
drug" is "any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is
not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling thereof. . ". ."  Obviously any drug which has
not previously been widely used cannot be "generally recognized as safe
and effective." Thus, all newly developed drugs are "new drugs" within
the meaning of the Act.' The developer of a "new drug" must submit a
new drug application (hereinafter NDA) to the FDA containing reports
of investigations which have been made to show the safety and effective-
ness of the drug for its intended use, the components and composition of
the drug, a description of the methods used in manufacturing the drug,
samples of the drug and a specimen of the labeling. 6
10. S. 5, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
11. 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1964).
12. 52 Stat. 1052 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1964).
14. 21 U.S.C. 321 (p) (1) (1964). As originally enacted in 1938, the new drug
provisions required only that a new drug manufacturer establish to the FDA's
satisfaction that his drug was safe for use; effectiveness was not mentioned. The FDA
took the position that if the value of a drug outweighed its danger, a new drug
application would have to be approved even though its claims of effectiveness were
exaggerated. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (to accompany S. 1552).
As a result a useless remedy or one with exaggerated claims of effectiveness might have
been approved if it were safe.
The requirement that a new drug be both safe and effective for its intended use
was one of several major revisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which
were enacted in 1962. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780,
also known as Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments Act of 1962. In addition to the
changes in the new drug provisions the Drug Amendments of 1962 provides that a drug
is adulterated if not manufactured in accordance with current good manufacturing
practice (§ 102) ; allow the F.D.A. to designate official names for drugs (§ 111)
[See Note, Drug Amendments of 962-Generic-Name Prescribing: Drug Price
Panacea? 16 STAx. L. REv. 649 (1964)] ; set standards for prescription drug advertising
(§ 131); amend the factory inspection provision (§ 201); and require registration of
producers of drugs (§ 301).
Just as passage of the 1938 Act with the first pre-market clearance provisions was
hastened by the "Elixer Sulfanilamide" disaster, the 1962 amendments were sparked by
controversy surrounding the drug Thalidomide in 1961 and early 1962. Use of this
sedative by pregnant women in Europe produced an estimated 3,500 to 5,000 malformed
babies. S. REv. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1962) (to accompany S. 1552)
(views of Senators Kefauver, Carroll, Dodd, Hart and Edward W. Long). Despite
persistent efforts of the American licensee of the drug to get the new drug application
for Thalidomide approved, the medical officer in charge of the new drug application
managed to delay any action for over one year, and the firm then withdrew its application
after the German experience. S. REP. No. 1744, supra at 41-42. See also R. HARIUs,
THE REAL VOICE 184-193 (1964).
15. See Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1958).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1964) ; 21 C.F.R. § 130.4 (1964).
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After the manufacturer's data' have been studied by the New Drug
branch of the Bureau of Medicine of FDA, the NDA is either approved,s
returned to the applicant as insufficient with a request for additional data, 9
or refused.2" If the application is not accepted, the applicant may request
a hearing on the question of whether such application is approvable.2
The FDA will not approve a new drug application if: the tests sub-
mitted are inadequate; the results of tests show the drug is unsafe; the
method of manufacture is inadequate to preserve the identity, strength,
quality, and purity of the drug; all of the information available is insuf-
17. All testing of new drugs is done by the manufacturer of the drug. While it
might appear that greater public protection would be achieved through independent
testing by FDA, several practical considerations mitigate against such a practice. The
FDA has neither the personnel nor the facilities to conduct independent tests on each
of the hundreds of new drug applications submitted and re-submitted each year, the cost
of governmental testing would be prohibitive, and the drug industry would oppose such
a plan as an interference with their research and development. One author does suggest
pre-market testing by the FDA or private medical institutions. See Rheingold, infra note
18, at 147.
18. 21. U.S.C. § 355(c) (1) (1964). A basic premise of the present new drug
procedures is that the data submitted by the manufacturer will be complete, accurate
and honest. Consequently, a manufacturer who wants to market a dangerous or ineffective
drug can do so if he submits false data which indicate plausible reactions to the drug.
A review can only evaluate the NDA in terms of possibilities and probabilities of what
a set of ingredients will do. See generally CLINIcAL TESTING OF NEW DRUGS (A.
Herrick & M. Cattell ed. 1965); Van Winkle, New Drug Applications in DRUG
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (A. Smith & A. Herrick ed. 1948); Kleinfeld, New
Drug Applications and Suspension Procedure, 18 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 632 (1963);
Smith, New Drug Applications 17 FOOD DRUG Cos-A. L.J. 497 (1962). Nevertheless, it is
extremely difficult to satisfy the FDA even with accurate data. Only forty new drug
applications were approved in 1966. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND
WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT 198 (1966). However, if the new drug application shows
reactions which are neither impossible nor improbable the reviewer, absent independent
information, can be fooled.
False toxicity studies were submitted in the new drug application for the anticho-
lesterol drug MER/29, which failed to indicate the eye danger which the tests by the
company had revealed. Toole v. Richardson Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Reptr. 398 (1967).
See generaly M. MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE (1965). MER/29's applica-
tion was approved and seven million dollars worth of the drug were sold before the
fraud was discovered. Submission of false information to the FDA is a criminal
offense [18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964)] and the corporations involved were convicted and
fined a total of eighty thousand dollars, with imposition of sentence suspended following
a plea of nolo contendere. Damage suits brought by the over 400 individuals who had
sustained injuries from use of MER/29 prayed for approximately 200 million dollars
in damages. E. KEFAUVER, IN A FEw HANDs 60 (1965) ; see Rheingold, The MER/29.
Story-An Instance of Successfd Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116,
133 (1968). It has been estimated that at least 5,000 persons were injured by MER/29.
In reality, the number could be much higher because many people never attributed an
injury to the drug. Rheingold, supra, at 121.
The MER/29 experience, while not unique, is uncommon. See Rheingold, supra,
at 144 n.82-83.
19. 21 C.F.R. 130.11 (1968). An applicant may submit an amendment to a
pending application, 21 C.F.R. 130.7 (1968), and an approved new drug application may
be changed through a supplemental application, 21 C.F.R. 130.9 (1968).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1964).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 3 55(c) (2) (1964).
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ficient to determine the safety of the drug; the drug is ineffective; or the
labeling of the drug is false and misleading in any particular.2 After a
new drug application has been approved, the FDA may withdraw approval,
after due notice and opportunity for a hearing, if the agency subsequently
finds the drug either unsafe or ineffective. Failure of the manufacturer
to maintain records or permit access thereto provides an additional basis
for the withdrawal of the new drug application.24
The new drug section as originally enacted contained a "grandfather
clause" which exempted from the coverage of the new drug requirements
any drug, whether or not generally recognized as safe, "if at any time
prior to enactment of this chapter the drug was subject to the Food and
Drugs Act of 1906" and "if at such time its labeling contained the same
representations concerning the conditions of its use. .. ."" As a result
it was not necessary to submit a new drug application for pre-existing
remedies unless the labeling were later revised to recommend a new or
different use for the drug or a different duration of administration." The
1962 amendment which required that a drug be effective as well as safe
perpetuated the exception verbatim so that a drug approved for sale before
1962, and therefore before the act required that a drug be effective in addi-
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1)-(6) (1964) ; 21 C.F.R. § 130.12 (1968).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964). Withdrawal of approval may be based upon
clinical experience or other scientific data available at the time the application was
approved, new evidence not available until after the application was approved, or new
information about the drug evaluated together with the evidence available when the
application was approved. 21 U.S.C. § 355e(1)-(3) (1964). See Bell v. Goddard, 366
F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1966). Any untrue statement of a material fact in an application
shall also cause approval of such application to be withdrawn. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (e)
(4) (1964).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964). Drugs intended solely for investigational use by
qualified experts are exempt from the requirements of the new drug section. 21 U.S.C
§ 355(i) (1964). Under authority of this section the Secretary has promulgated
regulations which spell out in detail elaborate procedures for obtaining an investigational
new drug exemption. 21 C.F.R. 130.3 (1968) (new drugs for investigational use in
human beings); and 21 C.F.R. 130.3a (1968) (new drugs for investigational use in
animals). Whether or not a drug qualifies for an investigational exemption is within
the primary jurisdiction of the FDA so that any initial attempt to obtain an investiga-
tional exemption must be made through the FDA and not the courts Rutherford v.
American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Tutoki v. Celebrezze, 375 F.2d
105 (7th Cir. 1967). See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
If an application for an investigational exemption is denied or a previously granted
exemption is withdrawn, there is no provision for appeal from such an order in the
statute. The only recourse available to the unsuccessful applicant is to file a new
drug application, demand a hearing if the application is not approved, and if no relief
is granted at the hearing appeal from the Secretary's order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
355(h) (1964). See Turkel v. Food and Drug Adm'n Dep't of H.E.W., 334 F.2d 844
(6th Cir. 1964).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1964).
26. Merritt v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 518 (D.D.C. 1958).
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tion to being safe,27 would not be deemed to be a new drug if its labeling
contained no new representations concerning the conditions of its use.-5
However, another "grandfather clause" enacted in a different section in
196229 allows the FDA, after the expiration of a two year period beginning
with the enactment date, to withdraw approval of a previously approved
NDA, if:
On the basis of new information before him with respect
to such drug, evaluated together with the evidence available to
him when the application was approved, . . . there is a lack of
substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports
or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended or suggested in the labeling thereof."0
Under this provision the FDA may re-examine the hundreds of drugs
that were approved for sale to the public during the years 1938 to 1962
without regard to their efficacy. To accomplish this reappraisal an ex-
haustive review is being conducted by the National Academy of Sciences
concerning the usefulness of 2,900 drugs sold in as many as 17,400
different formulations.3 1
27. Relabeling a drug after the enactment date in 1962 may automatically transform
the drug into a new drug even if the relabeling is ordered by a court after seizure and
condemnation pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1964). United States v. Allan Drug Co.,
357 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
28. See note 14 supra.
29. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107(c) (3) (B).
30. 21 U.S.C. 355(e)(3) (1964). This section is incorporated by reference into
§ 107(c) (3) (B) of the Drug Amendments of 1962. For a summary of the legislative
history of these sections see Goodrich, Legislative Background, in The Washington
Briefing on FDA's Efficacy Review, FDA PAPERS 12 (March, 1968).
31. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 1968, at 4, col. 2. The FDA has neither the
personnel nor the facilities to undertake such a massive research task. Instead a con-
tract was let to nongovernment scientists. UNITED STAT's DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUC.
AND WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT 197 (1966). In addition to relieving the FDA of the
burden of testing thousands of drugs the prestige of the National Academy of Sciences
is such that it was able to attract medical experts who would not deign to work directly
for the federal bureaucracy. Furthermore the Academy's untarnished scientific reputa-
tion will make its conclusions much less susceptible to challenge than judgments of the
FDA. Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1968, at 6, col. 2. See generally The Washington
Briefing on FDA's Drug Efficacy Review, FDA PAPERS 7 (March, 1968).
The compounds reviewed by the academy are divided into five categories: 1) "in-
effective," 2) "possibly effective," 3) "probably effective," 4) "effective, but," and 5)
"effective." The "ineffective" compounds will be taken off the market. Further testing
will be necessary in the case of "possibly" and "probably effective" drugs before their
new drug applications will be suspended. "Effective, but," drugs are those containing
two or more ingredients not all of which are effective, or single ingredient drugs which
are effective for some but not all of the uses suggested on their labeling. With respect
to these "effective, but" drugs, the FDA will ask manufacturers to remove the ineffective
component from the combination drugs and to relabel the single ingredient drugs to
delete any exaggerated claims. Of course, nothing additional will be required in the case
of drugs categorized "effective." Once the review is completed the FDA has the
authority and the personnel to carry out this program expeditiously; however, if the
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DEVICE QUACKERY-THE EVIL OF UNCHECKED DEVICE PRODUCTION
EXAMINED
Is there any requirement that a device 2 be proved safe and effective
prior to interstate shipment? Under the present provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act the answer is an unqualified "No." Thus,
a manufacturer who wishes to market a new type of sustained release
aspirin must comply with the exacting demands of the new drug regula-
tions33 while the manufacturer of an X-ray machine may market this
product without interference. Medical technology is developing a vast
array of medical devices which will not require pre-market clearance;
under the present Act even artificial organs may be implanted into human
patients without prior proof of their safety and efficacy. The only remedy
the government has against dangerous or ineffective devices is the pon-
derous procedure of seizure after interstate shipment.3" Then, after a
trial, the device may be condemned and eventually destroyed. 3 In a
drug companies demand to exercise their right of a public hearing to contest each
suspension of a new drug application, the FDA will be bogged down in a bureaucratic
quagmire which will cripple regulatory activities for years.
Where "an imminent hazard to the public health" is found, the FDA is empowered to
order suspension of approval of a new drug application immediately and to remove the
drug from the market before a hearing is held. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964). After sus-
pension, the manufacturer is given notice of his opportunity for an "expedited hearing"
on the propriety of the agency's action but in the meantime the public is protected by the
withdrawal of the drug from the market.
32. In the definition section of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, "drug"
and "device" are defined separately. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1964) (drug) ; 21 U.S.C. §
321 (h) (1964) (device). See discussion at note 100 infra.
33. Timed release drugs containing dosages in excess of that considered safe for
a single dose are regarded by the FDA as new drugs requiring the submission of a new
drug application, 24 Fed. Reg. 3756 (1959).
In the closing days of the 90th Congress the first steps towards control
of X-ray devices were taken. The Radiation Control for Health and Safety
Act of 1968, was signed by the President on October 18, 1968. The act allows
the government to set performance standards for products which emit electronic
product radiation. Manufacturers are required to provide the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare with performance data and other technical data
related to safety in order for the Secretary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Section 360A(c). In addition to X-ray machines and color television sets which
emit radiation certain medical devices are covered by the act. These include
products which emit sonic, infrasonic and ultrasonic waves. Section 355 (1) (B).
34. A device which is alleged to be adulterated or misbranded may be seized when
introduced into or while in interstate commerce or while held for sale after shipment
in interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. 334(a) (1964). See, e.g., United States v. Diapulse
Mfg. Corp., 269 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1969).
35. 21 U.S.C. §334(d) (1964). In lieu of destruction the court may order the
article sold and the proceeds paid into the United States Treasury or conditioned upon
the payment of costs and the execution of a bond the article may be returned to the
owner to be brought into compliance with the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 344(d) (1964). See
United States v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp., 269 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1967), ajffd,
389 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1969), and United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1968). Reconditioning or. relabeling an article
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seizure action the government has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence its allegation that the article seized is misbranded or
adulterated"8 in contrast with the pre-market clearance procedure estab-
lished for new drugs which puts the burden on the manufacturer to sub-
mit evidence to the FDA that the drug is safe and effective for its in-
tended use."
The number of devices available which claim to be panaceas for
mankind's various illnesses is limited only by the ingenuity of those who
see pain and suffering as a means to acquire wealth. In the absence of
pre-market clearance procedures device quackery has proliferated; a
casual glance at the annual reports of the FDA or the reported misbranded
device cases reveals a bizarre assortment of gadgets that challenges
credulity.
Fantastic devices for which outrageous claims are made are not
only historical phenomena but a serious present day "racket." 8 In 1966
the government seized and condemned a "Cameron spitler Amblyo-
Syntonizer" consisting of a metal tube inside of which were a light bulb,
metal discs and colored glass filters, claimed by the owner to be useful in
the treatment of eye disease. 9 Also in 1966 FDA seized an "ionic
charger" whose labeling suggested that drinking water charged with
"Radon" gas from the device was effective in treating, inter alia, gout,
rheumatism and liver disease.4"
Today's device quackery cases follow the pattern of earlier cases in
that the device typically is described in exotic terminology with claims
that the device will cure those diseases for which legitimate medical
science does not have a cure, e.g., arthritis or cancer." The hopeless and
incurable are most vulnerable to claims of relief from such questionable
may be done only with permission of the court. Research Laboratories Inc. v. United
States, 167 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1948). United States v. 1322 Cans . . . Black Raspberry
Puree, 68 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
36. See United States v. Wood, 226 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v.
449 cases . . .Tomato Paste, 212 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Five Cases
... Figlia Mia, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1964). Only when the application is approved does the
burden of proving a drug unsafe to justify suspension of the application shift to the
government. Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1966).
38. See generally E. JAMESON, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF QUACKERY (1961) ; L.
LASAGNA, THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA 22-39 (1962). Cf. R. SMITH, THE HEALTH HUCK-
STERS (1960) ; Note, Quackery it California, 11 STAN. L. REv. 265 (1959).
39. United States v. An Article of Device ... Cameron Spitler Amblyo-Syntonizer,
261 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1966).
40. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT 203
(1966).
41. E.g., United States v. Urbreteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948). The claimant, who
termed himself a naturopathic physician, used electrical "Sinuothermic" devices to treat
cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, arthritis and paralysis. 335 U.S. at 356.
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sources. The gullible have spent countless dollars to cure "innumerable
diseases and conditions," including leukemia, through use of such devices
as orgone energy acculators.'"
Most quack devices are harmless in themselves. 3 Use of these
devices is hazardous only when the patient foregoes proper medical
treatment while undergoing ineffectual therapy from the quack and his
miraculous machine. Avoidance of rational medical treatment will fre-
quently allow a curable malady to progress unchecked into an incurable
state while the patient thinks he is being cured. In one case, for example,
a lump on a woman's breast developed into malignant cancer while being
treated by the Drown Radio Therapeutic Instrument."
42. United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96, 98 (D. Maine
1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1955). The devices were also alleged to be beneficial
in the treatment of "cancer, anemia, arteriosclerosis, brain tumors, diabetes, gastric
ulcers, Burger's disease. . . ." In addition patients have purchased treatments from such
things as: (1) a "colortherm" to cure disorders of the liver, eyes, female trouble, etc.
United States v. Four Devices . . . "Colortherm," 176 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1949). (2)
a "Colonic Irrigator" for everything from arthritis to "a host of ills that have heretofore
been obscure." The purpose of this device was to flush out the colon by forcing a stream
of pulsating water into the intestines. Unites States v. One Device . . . "Colonic
Irrigator," 160 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1947). The labeling accompanying the device stressed
the need for a clean colon because:
Improper function of the colon is the most frequent contributing cause of
intestinal toxemia and the following accompanying symptoms and ailments.
They can now be successfully treated by our methods.
Arthritis, Asthma, Colitis, Constipation, Excessive Fatigue, Foul Breath,
Headache, Gall Bladder Complications. High and Low Blood Pressure, In-
digestion, Irregular Heart, Kidney and Bladder Complications, Liver Com-
plications, Lumbago, Menopause Disturbances, Muddy or Pimply Complexion,
Migraine. Nervousness, Pruritus Ani, Rheumatism, Sinus Trouble, Run Down
Condition, Shortness of Breath, Sleeplessness, Ulcers of Colon. Id. at 197 n.2.
(3) The Drown Radio Therapeutic Instrument is among the more outlandish devices
seized by the FDA over the years. It was a radio diagnostic and treatment machine
represented "as efficacious in treating kidney and bladder complications, tipped uterus,
extra kidney, painful urination, streptococcus in the urethra and the pyloric end of the
stomach and bladder, cirrhosis and carcinoma of the right kidney, low function of the
left supra-renal gland, pancreas, fibrous adhesions in the brain and medulla, heart
trouble, head pains and noises, explosions in the right ear while falling asleep, constipation,
pains in the lower back, abcesses, loss of speech and memory, worry, fear and nervousness,
conditions of the colon and liver." The machine needed only a single drop of the patient's
blood for diagnosis and all subsequent treatments. The operator of the machine tuned in
on the frequency vibration of the disease no matter where the patient was and the vibra-
tions allegedly would cause the diseased cells to fall away automatically. Drown v.
United States, 198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952).
43. E.g., United States v. Ghadiali, 165 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1958). The "Spectro-
Chrome" device "consisted of a cabinet equipped with a 1,000 watt electric light bulb,
an electric fan and water container for cooling purposes, two glass condenser lenses to
focus the rays from the electric light bulb and five ordinary glass slides, each of a dif-
ferent color." The patient was "irradiated" with harmless "attuned color waves"
projected through the colored glass side. See also United States v. Ellis Research
Laboratories, 300 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962), which
involved a highly sensitive galvanometer called "Micro-Dynameter."
44. Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952).
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Occasionally the device itself may be harmful. The Halox Thereputic
Generator"5 was a device for the electrolysis of sodium chloride (salt).
Carbon electrodes were extended into a salt solution and, when the
generator carried electricity to the electrodes, electrolysis of the solution
produced chlorine gas which was blown through a rubber hose by a fan.
The patient received "chlorine inhalation therapy" by holding the hose to
his nose and inhaling a mixture of air and chlorine gas.46 Not only was
the device ineffective in fulfilling any of the claims made for it, but experts
testified at the trial that an effective antiseptic concentration of chlorine
gas would be irritating to the average individual, that only very slight
concentrations of chlorine gas could be inhaled safely, and that the
directions on the device did not indicate which dial settings would provide
safe concentrations of the gas. 7
An X-ray machine is another example of a device which is inherently
hazardous; in the hands of an untrained individual untold harm can be
done." Yet, one unconscionable manufacturer was selling X-ray machines
to beauty shop operators for use in the removal of superfluous hair, even
though doses heavy enough to kill hair follicles will cause severe injury
to the skin which may develop into skin cancer.49
Despite the fact that a device can be as ineffective and dangerous as
a drug, the FDA has no statutory authority to establish pre-market
conditions for devices-the only means by which the public can be
adequately protected. The laxity of device regulation when compared to
the severity of drug regulation reveals an unfounded regulatory
dichotomy.
The Definitional Dilemma
Since only drugs are subject to pre-market clearance it is essential
to answer the question: What is a drug? The Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act states:
The term 'drug' means (A) articles recognized in the
official United States Pharmacopeia, official Homeopathic Phar-
macopeia of the United States, or official National Formulary,
or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
45. United States v. Twenty-two Devices . . . Halox Therapeutic Generator, 98
F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
46. Id. at 915.
47. Id. at 919.
48. See FDA Trade Correspondence No. 163 (Mar. 14, 1940) in V. KLEINFFLD &
C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
REcORD (1938-49) 133 (1949) [hereinafter cited as KLEINFELD & DUNN].
49. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 228 (1951).
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of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use
as a component of any articles specified in clause (A), (B),
or (C) ; but does not include devices or their components, parts,
or accessories. °
Struggling with this definition of drug, courts have determined
that the following articles, none of which would be considered drugs by
a layman, are drugs because they fit within one of the definitions of
drugs included in the Act: mineral water,5 ' peppermint tea, 2 water,53
gauze bandages, 4 insect powder, 5  honey," whole human blood, 7
cigarettes, 8 vaginal suppositories" and unrefined petroleum oil."0
The first subsection of the definition of drug, recognition in one of
the official pharmocopoeias, accounts for the inclusion of gauze bandages
on the list of drugs. Pharmacopoeias were developed in the nineteenth
century to provide pharmacists with authoritative definitions of drugs in
terms of their chemical components.6 ' These "official compendia" set
standards for the composition and sterility of drugs. Delegation of the
power to standardize drugs6 2 to the private agencies which publish the
50. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (1964).
51. Goodwin v. United States, 2 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1924) (Under the definition
of drug in the Food and Drugs Act of 1906).
52. United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957).
53. Bradley v. United States, 264 F. 79 (5th Cir. 1920) (under the definition of
drug in the Food and Drugs Act of 1906).
54. United States v. Forty-eight Dozen Packages... Gauze Bandages, 94 F.2d 641
(2d Cir. 1938).
55. See United States v. Nagase, 11 Ct. Cust. App. 144 (1921). Using the definition
of drug in the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 the Customs Court held powder produced
from pulverized Japanese camonile flowers and used as an ingredient in insect powders
to be a drug dutiable at ten per cent ad valorem under the Tariff Act of 1913.
56. United States v. 250 Jars . . . U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208
(E.D. Mich. 1963) affd 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965).
57. United States v. Calise, 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
58. United States v. Forty-six cartons . . . Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336
(D.N.J. 1953) ; United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing Aid Cigarettes.
178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959); but see F.T.C. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108
F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
59. United States v. Grayce, 126 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ind. 1954)
60. United States v. Nine Bottles... Colusa Natural Oil, 78 F. Supp. 721 (N.D.
Iowa 1947). In addition to the articles listed, some other articles not usually thought of
as drugs but which are regarded as such by the FDA are Saccharin in tablet form,
FDA Trade Correspondence 388 (July 21, 1942), KLEINFELD & DUNN 726; Corn
removers and Corn pads; FDA Trade Correspondence 21 (Feb. 9, 1940), KLEINFELD
& Duxx 580.
61. See Urdang, Developnent of the Pharmacopoeias, 8 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J.
69 (1953).
62. See generally 2 H. TouLmiN, THE LAW OF FOODS, DRUGS AND COSMETICS §
40 at 931-36 (2d ed. 1963).
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pharmacopoeias relieves the FDA of the duty of doing so although the
constitutionality of such delegation is questionable."3
Many articles not normally thought of as drugs are listed in one
of the pharmacopoeias because standards of sterility have been established
for that article. For example, because standards of sterility have been
recognized for absorbant cottons this particular article is recognized in
the official United States Pharmacopoeia. However, courts have reasoned
that not only those articles included in the official compendia are drugs
but also similar articles. For example, in the gauze bandage case the court
said:
[T]he recognition in the Pharmacopeia of absorbant
cotton, a substance generally similar in composition and use to
a gauze bandage, sufficiently shows that the latter, while not it-
self recognized, is of a kind with what is. ... "
Honey would normally be classified as food and therefore within
the exception to subsection (C); however, it is the intended use as
described in the labeling which is determinative of an article's classifica-
tion. If the labeling states that the honey has medicinal and curative
properties for the prevention and treatment of various diseases, such as in
a recent case where honey was represented as a cure for conditions ranging
from arthritis to weakening of potency, the honey is intended for use in
the cure and treatment of disease within the meaning of subsection (B)
of the definition of drug; therefore, the honey labeled as a cure is a drug
within the meaning of the act.65
The history of cigarettes further illustrates the ethereal nature of the
definition of drug under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Cigarettes offered as an aid in reducing were held to be drugs under
subsection (C) because they were intended to affect the structure and/or
function of the human body by reducing the appetite, thereby achieving
63. See generally Christopher, Validity of Delegation of Power to a Private
Agency-The Pharmacopoeia Provisions, 6 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 641 (1951) ; Develop-
ments in the Law-The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV. L. RF-v.
671-73 (1954).
64. United States v. Forty-eight Dozen Packages . . . Gauze Bandages, 94 F.2
641, 642 (2d Cir. 1938). In United States v. Articles of Drugs . . . Vit-Ra-Tox, 263
F. Supp. 212, 215 (D. Neb. 1967) the court states: "The principal ingredient of Vit-Ra-
Tox 16 Hydrated Aluminum Sulfate, is listed in the Pharmacopoeia of the U.S., there-
fore '# 16' is a drug as a matter of law." Vitamin capsules were held to be drugs
because vitamins are recognized in the Pharmacopoeias. United States v. Hain, (S.D.
Cal. 1943), reported in KLEINFELD & DUNN 265. Cf. United States v. Frank, 189 F.
195, 199 (S.D. Ohio 1911).
65. United States v. 250 jars . .. U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.
Mich. 1963), aff'd, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965).
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a reduction of the body's weight.66 Cigarettes represented as useful in
relieving respiratory diseases were held to be drugs under subsection (B)
because they were intended for use in the cure and treatment of disease."7
In addition to the potential malleability of the statutory definition of
drugs, the definitions of drugs and devices under the Act are in part
identical. Drugs are defined, inter alia, as "articles intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man
or other animals.""8 Devices are defined as "instruments, apparatus, and
contrivances . . . intended for use in the diagnosis, cure mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals."6
For those to whom the difference between an article and an instru-
ment, apparatus, or contrivance is not readily apparent, a perusal of the
dictionary definitoin of these words unfortunately will only compound the
confusion. An article is defined as a "thing" or "commodity. °7 It is
difficult to conceive of any object which is not a thing, yet if there is a
difference between drugs and devices there must be a difference between
things and devices. Instrument is defined as a "tool" or "implement" ;1
contrivance, a "mechanical device" ;72 apparatus is "machinery" or
"mechanism. ' 73 Attempting to apply these definitions to actual cases
proves to be an entertaining, albeit sometimes futile exercise.
66. United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing Aid Cigarettes, 178
F. Supp. 847 (D.NJ. 1959).
67. United States v. Forty-six Cartons . . . Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336
(D.N.J. 1953). The FDA's success in classifying two types of cigarettes within two of
the definitions of drug was not equalled by the Federal Trade Commission when that
agency unsuccessfully attempted to characterize regular Chesterfield cigarettes as drugs
because tobacco is included in The Homeopathic Pharmocopoeia. Mere incluison of
"tincture of tobacco" in the Homeopathic Pharmocopoeia was insufficient to persuade
the court that all forms of tobacco were drugs. The court conceded that it was not
necessary for cigarettes, as such, to be listed in the Pharmocopoeia in order to invoke
the imprimatur of the compendium because "[s]urely, if smoking tobacco is a drug, the
manner in which it is packaged, and what it is called after packaging is, in this instance,
of no greater significance than the difference between some other drug preparation in
pill or powder form." Nevertheless tincture of tobacco, a liquid preparation of "Tabacum,"
distilled water and "strong alcohol" was held to be a preparation "far removed in form
and purpose from the ordinary cigarette." FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108
F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) [under an identical definition in the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(c) (1964)]. Although the court did
not cite nor distinguish the gauze bandage case (note 54, supra) it apparently decided
that non-recognized cigarette tobacco was not "of a kind with what is." See 108 F. Supp.
at 575. Likewise the court was unpersuaded that claims in advertisements that Chester-
fields would prevent irritation were claims that the cigarette had a beneficial effect on
the body and was a drug. Claims of nonadverseness are not such claims as cause an
article to be given the status of a drug. See id. at 575-77.
68. See text at note 50 supra.
69. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1) (1964).
70. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERMATIOiAL DicTIoNARY (3d ed. 1966).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Whether a given instrument, apparatus or contrivance will be
classified as a device within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act and therefore within the jurisdiction of the FDA and
subject to the provisions of the Act, is contingent upon the claim of
therapeutic value made for the product. Just as not all cigarettes are
drugs,"4 not all combs, for example, are devices. But a comb labeled "for
dandruff and scalp infection" is a device.7' An ordinary toothbrush is not
a therapeutic device; the same is not true of a toothbrush represented as
useful in treating pyorrhea.Y If the definitions of drug and device overlap,
why not classify every product as a drug within the broader category of
article? Unfortunately, such an effortless exit would blatantly ignore the
congressional mandate in the language at the end of the defintion of drug
74. See text at notes 66 & 67 sup-ra.
75. FDA Trade Correspondence 111 (Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 613.
76. United States v. 2000 . . . Cases . . . Toothbrushes, 231 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Pa.
1964) : FDA Trade Correspondence 109 (Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 612. Similarly
the FDA regards surgical rubber gloves as devices whereas ordinary rubber gloves for
household use are not so regarded. FDA Trade Correspondence 41 (Feb. 12, 1940).
Kleinfeld & Dunn 585-86. The following list illustrates a few of the products the FDA
considers to be devices within the meaning of the Act: ankle supports, FDA Trade
Correspondence 105 (Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 611; clinical heat pads,
FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 228 (1951); clinical thermometers, FDA
Trade Correspondence 316 (Aug. 20, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 693; dental plates, FDA
Trade Correspondence 260 (Apr. 25, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 671; elastic and leather
wrist bands and athletic supporters, FDA Trade Correspondence 104 (Feb. 29, 1940),
Kleinfeld & Dunn 611; hot water bottles, FDA Trade Correspondence (Feb. 29, 1940).
Kleinfeld & Dunn 613; prophylactics, see, e.g., United States v. 43Y2 Gross . . . Rubber
Prophylactics, 65 F. Supp. 534 (D. Minn. 1946), aff'd sub. noma., Gellman v. United States
159 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1947) ; surgical instruments, such as knives, scissors, foreceps, saws,
mallets, chisels, needles, nails, drills, and screwdrivers, FDA Trade Correspondence 160
(Mar. 14, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 631; sutures, FDA Trade Correspondence 128
(Mar. 7, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 619; syringes, FDA Trade Correspondence 110
(Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 613; tongue depressors, FDA Trade Correspondence
100 (Feb. 21, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 609; x-ray machines, FDA Trade Correspondence
163 (Mar. 14, 1940) and FDA Trade Correspondence 333 (Sept. 5, 1940), Kleinfeld &
Dunn 633, 670; and sleep inducing phonograph records, United States v. Twenty-three,
More or Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1951) (recording intended to induce sleep
by suggestion). Cf. the medical devices mentioned in A. Leff, Medical Devices and
Paramedical Personnel: A Preliminary Context for Emerging Problems, 1967 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 332, 344-45 (1967). In a private damage action, Orthopedic Equipment Co. v.
Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960), a surgical nail was held to be a device within
the meaning of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.
The following articles have been ruled to be outside the provisions of the act, if not
medicated, and if not intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease in man or other animals, or if not used to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals: 1) materials used in taking dental
impressions, FDA Trade Correspondence 260 (Apr. 25, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 671.
The FDA regards materials used in filling teeth and in making dentures as "either
devices, accessories to devices, or drugs, depending upon the representations for the
specific article ..... Id. Dental plates are devices. Id. Razors and manicuring implements,
FDA Trade Correspondence 112 (Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 613; rubber
nipples, FDA Trade Correspondence 114 (Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 614; and
shaving brushes, FDA Trade Correspondence 109 (Feb. 29, 1940), Kleinfeld & Dunn 612.
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which bluntly states that the term drug "does not include devices or
their components, parts, or accessories.""
OTHER DEFINITIONS AND OTHER DICHOTOMIES
The Act's glossary contains other definitions which may overlap
with those already discussed. Cosmetics are "articles intended to be
rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise
applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying,
promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance. . . except that such
term shall not include soap.""8 Since there is no exemption of cosmetics
from the definition of drug such as there is for device, any indication
that the article is intended to affect the structure of the body or intended
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of
disease may bring it within the drug provisions."'
Toothpaste offered for the purpose of keeping teeth clean and breath
fresh is a cosmetic, but if claims are made that use of the product will
prevent tooth decay then it is intended for use in the prevention of
disease-ergo, it is a drug."° Similar transubstantiations will occur if
claims are made that a deodorant stops perspiration instead of merely
absorbing it or masking its odor8 or if a suntan lotion is represented as
not only an aid in obtaining an even tan but useful in preventing sun-
burn."2 Surprisingly the FDA regards some articles which clearly affect
the structure of the body, such as cuticle removers8 and depilatories"4
as cosmetics.
Soap is not a cosmetic. The Act is unequivocal about this. 5 What,
however, is the appropriate category for a medicinal soap represented to
be beneficial in the treatment and prevention of skin disease? The FDA
has said that representations of therapeutic benefit might transform a
soap, although exempted from the definition of cosmetic, into a drug."
77. See text at note 50 supra.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (1964).
79. See Kleinfeld, "Cosmetic" or "Drug'"-The Minotaur's Labyrinth, 22 FOOD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 376, 380 (1967).
80. Cf. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 229 (April 11, 1940), KLEiNFELD & DUNN
657. The word "healthful" on the label of tooth powder causes it to be classified as a
drug.
81. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 26 (Feb. 9, 1940), KLEIN FELD & DUNN 581.
82. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 61 (Feb. 15, 1940), KLEINFELD & DUNN 593.
Baby oil is a cosmetic unless claims are made for the article which changes it to a drug.
FDA Trade Correspondence No. 40 (Feb. 9, 1940), KLEINFELD & DUNN 585.
83. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 245 (April 25, 1940), KLEINFELD & DUNN 655.
84. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 24 (Feb. 29, 1940), KLEINFELD & DUNN 581.
85. 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (1964).
86. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 146 (Mar. 7, 1940), KLEIAFELD & DUNN
625, 626. The exemption of soap from the definition of cosmetic does not apply to
shampoos and shaving creams. Id. See United States v. 45 2/3 Dozen Packages... "U-X
Improved Shaving Medium," 46 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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If the soap were not generally recognized as safe and effective by qualified
experts, it would be a "new drug" which could not be marketed until the
manufacturer persuaded the FDA that the product was safe and efficacious
for its intended use. Under the FDA's construction of the statute, soap
is an all or nothing proposition. If the soap manufacturer is careful about
the claims he makes for his soap, he may avoid totally the restrictions of
the Act and the jurisdiction of the FDA. However, by a few incautious
words in an advertisement which could be construed by the FDA as
claims that the soap is intended for use in the cure, mitigation or treatment
of a disease, the soap manufacturer may find himself confronting the most
formidable pre-market barrier that any businessman has to hurdle-the
approval of a new drug application.
Face creams, represented as effective in removing wrinkles from
the skin caused by advanced age, inhabit the never-never land between
cosmetics and drugs. Smoothing out wrinkles would appear to be
"promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance, 87 yet at the same
time within the penumbra of drug's "affect the structure." '8 8
Two recent district court decisions involving virtually identical
wrinkle-removers illustrate the problem faced by FDA in attempting to
regulate uniformly products that are traditionally thought of as cosmetics
but which affect the structure of the body. "Line Away" by Coty was held
to be a drug because: "Obviously, by intending to smooth, firm and tigh-
ten the skin, Line Away has as its objective affecting the structure of the
skin. Hence it falls within the literal definition of a drug in section
321(b)(1)(c)." 9 A few months later "Sudden Change" by Hazel
Bishop was held to be a cosmetic because the judge thought the buyer
should be sufficiently skeptical to realize the claims that the product gives
a "face lift without surgery" and "smoothes out wrinkles" do not mean
a "structural change of the kind available through plastic surgery.""
Thus the effect on the structure of the body was insufficient to place the
article in the class of drugs.
While the term drug does not include device, there is no exclusion
87. 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (1) (1964).
88. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (3) (1964). In a recent case, United States v. Thirty-six
Boxes . . . "Line Away, Temporary Wrinkle Smoother, Coty," 284 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del.
1968), the court held the wrinkle smoother to be a drug because its intended use is to
affect the structure of the body. Contra, United States v. 216 Individually Cartoned
Bottles . . .Sudden Change, 288 F. Supp. 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, -F.2d-(2d Cir.
1969). Cf. FDA Trade Correspondence No. 9 (May 13, 1939), KLEtNFELD & Dcxx 565
(bleaching creams are both cosmetics and drugs).
89. United States v. Thirty-six Boxes . . . "Line Away, Temporary Wrinkle
Smoother, Coty" 284 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Del. 1968).
90. United States v. 216 Individually Cartoned Bottles ... Sudden Change, 288
F. Supp. 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, -F.2d-(2d Cir. 1969).
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of foods or cosmetics."' Chewing gum and any article used for food or
drink for man or other animals are foods. 2 Representations that a food
is intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, etc. of disease will cause the
article to be classified as a drug. 3 Foods, however, are specifically exempt-
ed from being treated as drugs if they are intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals. 4 All foods, with the
possible exception of chewing gum, are intended to affect the structure of
man in some fashion or another. Without this exemption all foods would
be drugs making them subject to the new drug pre-market clearance
requirements. Nevertheless, since it is possible for an article to be both a
food and a drug, many foods, particularly products advertised as diet
supplements or as nutritional supports, have been held to be drugs
because of therapeutic claims."
THE DEFINITIONAL DICHOTOMY IN PRACTICE:
THE AMP AND BACTO-UNIDISK CASES
Recently AMP Incorporated developed a new method of tying off
severed blood vessels during surgery. The FDA regarded the products
used in this method as new drugs requiring the submission of a new
drug application. AMP took the position that the products were devices,
and under the threat of regulatory proceedings if it did not comply with
the pre-market clearance requirements for new drugs, filed suit against
FDA seeking a declaratory judgment that its products were devices and
not subject to the new drug provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act."9
The articles involved appear to be devices in the normal sense of that
word, and without reference to the definitions of "drug" in the Federal
91. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (1964).
92. 21 U.S.C. §321(f) (1964).
93. E.g., honey, United States v. 250 Jars . . .U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F.
Supp. 208 (E.D. Mich. 1963), ajf'd, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (3) (1964).
95. United States v. Articles of Drug . . . "Vit-Ra-Tox," 263 F. Supp. 212 (D.
Neb. 1967) ; United States v. Articles of Drug... Foods Plus Inc., 239 F. Supp. 465
(D.N.J. 1965), remanded on other grounds stb. nont., United States v. Article of Drug
B-Complex Cholinos Capsules, 362 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v.
Nutrition Service Inc., 27 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir.
1965) ; United States v. Vitasafe Formula M, 226 F. Supp. 266 (D.N.J. 1964), remanded
on other grounds sub. nom., United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 918 (1965) ; United States v. Three Cartons . . . "No. 26
Formula G.M.," 132 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
96. AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 825
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968). The trial court held that the article
involved was a drug and the Second Circuit affirmed. However, the courts used different
reasoning to reach this result. Therefore to understand fully the issues involved in
determining whether this article is a drug or a device, it is necessary to analyze in detail
both opinions.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act characterization of the products involved
as drugs would be unlikely.
Both of the products are intended to be used in a new
method of tying off, or ligating, severed blood vessels during
surgery. The conventional ligating method is to hand-tie liga-
tures around severed vessels by means of a surgeon's knot
(which is a reef knot). AMP's products both consist of a
disposable applicator, a nylon ligature loop, and a nylon locking
disk. In one product the applicator is a hemostat [clamp] ; in
the other, it is a long slender tube. The ligature is applied by
inserting the hemostat or tube into the body and placing the
loop around the severed vessels then tightening the loop and
locking it in place with the disk. The excess nylon thread is cut
off, and the disk and the rest of the thread remain in the
patient's body."
AMP argued that because the nylon ligature loop and the locking
device are merely components, parts or accessories of the hemostat or the
tube, the whole product should be classified a device. The trial judge
rejected this argument and adopted the FDA's position that "the hemostat
or the tube is no more than a container for the method of applying the
suture."9 The court analogized the product to a drug administered by a
disposable syringe. "The syringe alone is a device when used separately
.... But a drug in a syringe will not become a component of a device
or a device for purposes of the act simply because it is packed for use in
such a syringe."99 Having accepted the Government's position that the
essential element of AMP's product is the suture, the court was urged
to classify the suture as a drug.
Narrowing the product involved to a suture enabled the Government
to point to the first subsection of the definition of drug which states:
"The term 'drug' means (A) articles recognized in the official United
States Pharmacopeia. . . ."' "Suture" is listed in the official USP'
To complete the syllogism, argued the Government, logic demands the
conclusion that sutures are drugs." 2 The court rejected such an easy
97. 389 F.2d at 826.
98. 275 F. Supp. at 413.
99. The FDA regards syringes by themselves as devices. FDA Trade Corres-
pondence No. 110 (Feb. 29, 1940), KLEINFELD & DUNN 613.
100. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (1) (1964).
101. XVII UNITED STATES PHAR-ACOPOEIA 691 (17th rev. ed. 1965).
102. The Government's argument is fallacious in that it fails to consider the last
phrase in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1964), "but does not include devices or their components,
parts, or accessories." If this phrase means what it says, then not all articles listed in a
pharmacopoeia are drugs because a device listed in one of the compendia is not a drug.
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solution to its dilemma, taking a middle position. The court stated that
"the listing of an item in an official compendium should be some evidence
that such item is a drug,"1 3 and looked at the definitions of "article"
(drug) and "instruments, apparatus and contrivances," (device). The
court quickly realized the futility of such an approach because the
products "are arguably either articles, or instruments, apparatus and
contrivances."'04
After exhausting all of the technical legal arguments offered by
counsel the court found the products to be drugs because:
The public will be better protected by classifying plaintiff's
products as drugs rather than devices so that proper testing,
controlled by the Government, can be pursued. It would seem
that where an item is capable of coming within two definitions,
that definition according the public the greatest protection
should be accepted.'
On appeal the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
that the products were new drugs and could not be shipped in interstate
commerce without an approved new drug application.' The court con-
ceded arguendo "that the hemostat and the tube taken alone are 'instru-
ments' and thus 'devices' within the meaning of the Act."0 But, relying
on the trial court's analogy to a drug packed in a disposable syringe,
Judge Smith rejected AMP's argument that the nylon thread and disk are
also devices because they are "components, parts, or accessories" of the
hemostat and the tube.' After pointing out that if it were not for the
provision in 21 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1964) which provides that the term
drug "does not include devices," . . . "the Act's definition of 'drug'
[would be] so broad as to cover AMP's disk and thread,"' 9 the court
traces the legislative history of the 1938 Act, noting that in the early
drafts of the bill there was no separate definition of "device." These early
versions defined the term drug as "all substances, preparations and devices
intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of
disease. . . ."' In the course of debate in the Senate this definition was
subjected to the criticism that ". . . to maintain that a purely mechanical
device is a drug and to be treated as a drug in law and in logic and in
103. 275 F. Supp. at 414.
104. Id. at 414.
105. Id.
106. AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968) ; cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825
(1968).
107. 389 F.2d at 827.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 828, citing 79 CoNG. REc. 4841-45 (1935).
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lexicography is a palpable absurdity. . . .""' In response to this criticism
a parallel, separate definition of device was inserted to insure that devices
would be subject to precisely the same requirements as drugs. The court
could find nothing in the legislative history indicating "that the Con-
gressional purpose in providing a separate definition of 'devices' was
anything other than to avoid the incongruity of classifying such things as
electric belts as 'drugs.' "112
When in 1937 the "Elixer Sulfanilamide" tragedy sparked Congress
to require pre-market clearance for new drugs,1 ' no thought was given to
the distinction between drugs and devices; yet, since only new "drugs"
were covered, the distinction between drugs and devices became important
for the first time. Giving the broadest possible construction to the word
"drug" for new drug purposes and the narrowest possible construction to
the word "devices" the court held that:
Since the only significance in classifying AMP's products
as either 'drugs' or 'devices' is that if they are 'drugs' they may
be subject to the new drug provisions of the Act, we must
classify them with reference to the purpose for which Congress
enacted those provisions. That purpose was, very clearly to keep
inadequately tested medical and related products which might
cause widespread danger to human life out of interstate com-
merce. The product which immediately precipitated Congres-
sional concern-"Elixir Sulfanilamide"-was a drug within the
everyday, narrow sense of the word, but we would hardly sup-
pose that when Congress incorporated the 'new drug' bills
resulting from the 'Elixir Sulfanilamide' tragedy into an Act
which contained an extremely broad definition of the word
'drug,' it intended that the operation of those provisions should
be restricted to products commonly called 'drugs,' and that
products such as ligatures, which might present the very dangers
the provisions were designed to meet, should be excluded. ...
The exclusionary classification 'devices' should, we think, be
limited to such things as Congress expressly intended it to cover.
The language of section 201 (g) plainly permits calling AMP's
nylon thread and disk, in their intended use, 'drugs,' and we hold
that that is their appropriate classification.'
111. Id. at 828, citing remarks of Senator Clark of Missouri, 79 CONG. REc. 4841
(1935).
112. Id. at 829.
113. See text accompanying note 7 szpra.
114. 389 F.2d at 829-30.
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THE DEFINITION DICHOTOMY IN ANTIBIOTIC
DRUG CERTIFICATION
Whether an article is classified as a "drug" or a "device" has
significance in other areas of drug regulation. When antibiotics, the
so-called wonder drugs, were developed the need arose for government
certification of batches of antibiotics. "' The certification regulations are
applicable only to drugs ;16 if one were thus able to conceptualize a product
containing an antibiotic as a device, such an article, not being a drug,
would not have to be certified prior to being shipped in interstate
commerce.
The history of antibiotic certification begins with the first antibiotic,
penicillin. Initially large scale production of penicillin was undertaken
to supply the armed forces with adequate supplies for the enormous
number of battle casualties suffered during World War II. The vagaries
of penicillin production, the instability of the product and the military's
purchasing specifications made it imperative that the FDA examine all
batches of penicillin." 7
Toward the end of the war when penicillin became available for
civilian use, Congress amended the Act to provide for certification of
products containing penicillin." 8 In 1949, when the certification section
was enlarged to include Aureomycin, Chloramphenicol and Bacitracin,
the FDA urged passage of the amendment because the unusual difficulties
inherent in the manufacture of these antibiotics and the manufacturers'
unsatisfactory methods of testing finished lots created an unusual likeli-
hood that lots would be marketed which were not of the appropriate
strength, quality and purity and created a need for a check of each batch
by a disinterested authority." 0 Later, as they came into use, other types
of antibiotics were added to the statute and in 1962 the Act was amended
to require certification for "any antibiotic drug."'°
115. Antibiotics did not come into general use until several years after- the enact-
ment of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
116. "The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, pursuant to regulations
promulgated by him, shall provide for the certification of batches of drugs composed
wholly or partly of any kind of penicillin, streptomycin, chlortetracycline, chlorampheni-
cal, bacitracin, or any other antibiotic drug or any derivative thereof." 21 U.S.C. § 357
(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
117. See W. Van Winkle, Drug Certification in DRUG RESEARCE AND DEVELOPMENT
402-03 (A. Smith & A. Herrick ed. (1948).
118. 59 Stat. 463 (1945).
119. See letter from Oscar Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency
in S. REP. 600 (to accompany H.R. 3151), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949). In 1949
the FDA was a part of the Federal Security Agency Under the Reorgaiization Plan No.
1 of 1953, the Federal Security Agency was abolished and all functions of that Agency
were transferred to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1964).
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At its inception the certification program had industry support, and
later some industry officials complained that certification was no longer
necessary on a batch-by-batch basis.' 21 In response to this, the 1962
amendment provided that antibiotic drugs may be exempted from the
batch certification rules if the manufacturer produces fifty or more
consecutive satisfactory batches within eighteen months or otherwise
demonstrates satisfactory consistency in production.'22 The procedure for
obtaining exemption from certification is explained in the regulations. -3
Antibiotic drug certification proceeds pursuant to regulations pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education and 'Welfare, as authoriz-
ed by the Act.12 Among the antibiotic drugs required to be certified are
antibiotic sensitivity discs, i.e., cardboard discs impregnated with various
antibiotics used in laboratory tests to determine which of several anti-
biotics will be most useful in treating a particular infection. One regula-
tion sets out the tests and methods of assay used to determine the potency
of these discs, the standards of potency, and the methods for calculating
potency. 2' Another regulation fixes the certification procedure for anti-
biotic sensitivity discs, and establishes approved standards of identity,
strength, quality and purity as well as packaging requirements and pro-
cedures to be followed to obtain certification by the FDA." In order to
obtain certification, the person requesting certification must submit tests
and assays made by him on a (accurately) representative sample and must
submit samples of the drug for re-testing in the Government's
laboratory. 2'
All of these regulations are based on the premise that antibiotic
sensitivity discs are "drugs" within the meaning of the Act and are
therefore subject to the antibiotic certification requirements of the Act.
Recently, however, the courts have had to deal with the question: Are
antibiotic sensitivity discs drugs or devices? As a result of two conflicting
121. See 2 H. ToULM IN, THE LAW op FOODS, DRUGS AND CosMETIcs § 29.2 (2d ed.
1963). Manufacturers of high quality antibiotics support certification because it protects
them from illegitimate competition and producers who are improperly equipped, in-
adequately staffed, or who make irresponsible representations for their products. W. Van
Winkle, Drug Certification. in DRUG RESEARC H AND DEVELOPMENT 415 (A. Smith & A.
Herrick ed. 1948) ; The FDA ruled recently that generic manufacturers of chlorampheni-
cal must conduct tests to prove that their versions of the drug are as effective as the
brand name version. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1967 at 3, col. 1.
122. 21 U.S.C. § 357(c) (1964).
123. 21 C.F.R. § 144 (1968).
124. 21 C.F.R. §§ 141-148z (1968).
125. 21 C.F.R. § 147.1 (1968).
126. 21 C.F.R. § 147.2 (1968).
127. 21 C.F.R. § 147.2(d) (1968).
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decisions the discs were drugs in Chicago and devices in Detroit.'28
The first of these cases was a suit to enjoin the shipment in interstate
commerce of a product labeled a "Multidisk," a circular piece of paper
around the circumference of which are individual discs each impregnated
with a different antibiotic. The "Multidisk" is used in laboratories to
test the sensitivity or reaction of a specimen, such as sputum, urine or
throat swab, drawn from a patient, to each of the antibacterial agents
contained on the small discs. The function of the disc is to indicate which
of the several antibiotics is to be preferred in treating the patient's in-
fection. 2 The sensitivity disc provides a means for eliminating much of
the trial and error approach to antibacterial therapy by identifying the
drug most likely to be effective without experimenting on the patient
himself.
After a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge
filed findings of fact and conclusions of law holding the "Multidisk" to
be "an article that is intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease in man within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. 321 (g).,,130 Thus "Multidisks" are drugs and subject to the
antibiotic certification requirements of the Act. A permanent injunction
enjoined the manufacturer from introducing into interstate commerce
any uncertified "Multidisk." Nowhere in the court's findings is there a
hint that the "Multidisk" might be something other than a drug. Neither
does the court mention that its definition of a "Multidisk" as an article
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, etc. does not exclude it from being
defined as a device.
In 1962, at approximately the same time the FDA was seeking to
enjoin Consolidated Laboratories from shipping uncertified "Multidisks"
in interstate commerce, a libel of condemnation' 3' was filed against another
128. Compare United States v. Consolidated Laboratories Inc., CCH F.D. GCs.r.
L. REP. 80,030 (N.D. Il. 1963) with United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto
Unidisk, 392 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 1410 (1969).
129. United States v. Consolidated Laboratories, CCH F.D. Cosmf. L. REP.
80,030 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
130. Id. at 80,106.
131. An ordinary libel "in rem" brought by the United States to condemn food in
interstate commerce as adulterated, is a "civil action." United States v. 935 Cases ...
Tomato Puree, 136 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1943) ; cert. denied, 320 U.S. 778 (1943). An
actual seizure is not a necessary prerequisite to a libel for condemnation. United States
v. Capon Water Co., 30 F.2d 300 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
The procedure in a libel for condemnation must conform as nearly as possible to the
admiralty rules. United States v. 74 Cases . . .Cobbs Pure Tropical Fruit Delicacies
Plum Jelly, 73 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Minn. 1947). Otherwise, all rights are determined as
in any other action at law. United States v. 397 cases . . . Salad Oil, 16 F. Supp. 387
(D. N. J. 1936). Admiralty rules apply only to the seizure of the property by process in
rein. After the seizure pursuant to libel, the proceedings take on the character of a law
action. United States v. Arizona Canning Co., 212 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1954); United
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brand of uncertified antibiotic sensitivity discs. Several cases of "Bacto-
Unidisks" were seized and alleged to be misbranded because they were
drugs composed partly of antibiotic drugs and not certified.132 A "Bacto-
Unidisk" is similar to a "Multidisk" in that it is a circular piece of card-
board in the form of a ring. Extending inwardly from the ring are eight
circular paper units, seven of which are impregnated with different
antibiotic drugs and the eighth with sulfadiazine, a chemical antibacterial
agent. Like "Multidisks," "Bacto-Unidisks" are used to determine which
antibiotic or sulfadiazine will be most effective in treating an infection. 3
At the trial both sides presented the expert testimony of doctors who
testified as to the medical definition of a drug. The doctors thought of
drugs as those articles applied to the body or taken internally either
orally or by injection." 4 Of course, the definition in the Act, not the
opinion of doctors, controls the definition of a drug for purposes of the
Act. Nevertheless, counsel for the Government and the claimant examined
and cross-examined medical experts for three days to produce a tran-
script of over 300 pages of irrelevant testimony.
The parade of medical witnesses did accomplish one thing; it enabled
the trial judge to render an opinion inconsistent with the statute by
substituting the medical definition of drug for the statutory definition of
drug. The judge cited the testimony of a doctor who was unable to think
of a drug which was neither taken into nor applied to the body."3 A
layman, when asked whether he thinks a piece of cardboard with anti-
biotics on it is a drug or a device will probably answer "device." A piece
of cardboard is not what one thinks of as a drug. After the trial the judge
was able to say that the "Bacto-Unidisk" is not a drug because it is not
"administered to man or other animals either internally or externally." '36
States v. 216 Bottles ... Sudden Change, 36 F.R.D. 695 (E. D. N. Y. 1965).
A libel of condemnation is no longer required since the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure superceded the old Admiralty Rules in July, 1966. See Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; Supplemental Rules For Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims;
Rule C, Actions In Rem; Special Provisions.
132. United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, Trial Court's finding's
of fact 1 and 4, Joint Appendix on Appeal 145a.
An uncertified antibiotic drug is deemed misbranded. 21 U.S.C. § 352(1) (1964).
The introduction into interstate commerce of a misbranded drug is a prohibited act,
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1964) and the misbranded article is subject to seizure and con-
demnation. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) 1964).
133. United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto Unidisk, Memorandumn
Opinion of Judge Thornton, Joint Appendix 150a (E.D. Mich. July 21, 1966).
134. See the excerpts from the transcript reproduced in the joint appendix prepared
for the appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Joint Appendix at 52a (Testimny
of Dr. C. K. Wolfe, Jr.) ; 92a-93a (Testimony of Dr. C. S. Keefer) ; 124a (Testimny
of Dr. L. C. Miller).
135. Memorandum Opinion, Joint Appendix at 153a.
136. Memorandum Opinion, Joint Appendix at 154a.
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This conclusion was no longer a layman's intuitive judgment but a
conclusion based on "expert testimony."
The trial court conceded that a literal reading of the definition of
drug contained in the act clearly applied to the "Bacto-Unidisk" but he
could not accept the idea that a piece of cardboard not taken into or applied
to the body is a drug. The court concludes its opinion by stating frankly,
if indelicately:
When it comes right down to the determination which we must
make, a literal reading of (g) (2) [21 U.S.C 321 (g) (2)]
which defines 'drug' as 'articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or
other animals' clearly has application to the article libeled herein.
Our reluctance to make this finding and conclusion our holding
is due to the fact that it appears to us to be ridiculous and
contrary to common sense....
We are not here called upon to decide if the disk is a device,
but it appears to us that consideration of it in this category
under (h) [21 U.S.C. 321 (h)] is far more appropriate than
consideration of it as a drug within the purview of (g) [21
U.S.C. 321 (g)]. 37
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's decision in an opinion which is noteworthy for its brevity, if for
no other reason.'38 The court attempts to rationalize its decision by co-
mingling the medical and legal definitions of drug with considerations of
legislative intent. In this way the court hedges the issues so that it does
not have a clear question to decide. Rather than accept the trial judge's
candid statement of his dilemma that a literal reading of the section which
defines drug as an article intended for use in the diagnosis, etc. of disease
clearly has application, the court qualifies the trial court's application of
the definition by explaining:
This [literal reading and application of the definition] is
only true in an indirect sense. Certainly it ['Bacto-Unidisk']
has nothing to do with diagnosis or prevention of disease. In
itself it is not intended for use either internally or externally
to cure, mitigate or treat disease. It could only aid the physician
in determining what antibiotics to use for the cure, mitigation
or treatment of the patient's disease. We agree with the trial
judge that it was not the legislative intent to apply the phrase
137. Memorandum Opinion, Joint Appendix at 153a-154a.
138. United States v. Bacto Unidisk, 392 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 89 S. Ct.
1410 (1969).
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'intended for use in the ... cure, mitigation, treatment . .' in
such an indirect manner."'
Careful scrutiny of the court's reasoning reveals that the opinion violates
not only the spirit and purpose of the Act but the letter of the law as well.
Drug is defined disjunctively in the act; an article fits within the
definition if it is used in diagnosis, etc. or prevention of disease.'
Therefore, an article is a drug if it is intended for use in any aspect of
disease therapy or prophylaxis. Furthermore the act does not require
that the article be used either internally or externally but only that it be
intended for use in contravention of disease; the manner of utilization is
immaterial. It may be conceded that an antibiotic sensitivity disc is not
intended for use in the diagnosis or prevention of disease. With respect
to the other parts of the definition, however, the disc clearly is intended
for use in the "cure, mitigation or treatment of disease." Realizing the
definition is sufficiently broad to encompass the libelled article, the court
amended the statutory definition by adding the requirement that the
article be used internally or externally. Nowhere in the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act is there any mention of the requirement that a
drug be applied either internally or externally. Consequently, the external
or internal condition that the court imposes can only have come from the
medical understanding of the word drug. Again, in protestation, it must
be pointed out that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not
include any reference to the medical definition of drug or any standard
other than the definition contained in 21 U.S.C. 321 (g) (1964). The
court's confusion can be forgiven because the transcript is filled with the
testimony of medical experts who attempted to articulate their definition
(a medical definition) of drug.14'
It is far more difficult, however, to forgive the court's lack of candor
in imposing an additional test-direct versus indirect manner of use.
Once more the absence of any prerequisite of directness in the statute must
be pointed out. With respect to the court's off-hand comment that it was
not the legislative intent to apply the phrase in such an indirect manner,
there is no indication that the court referred to the legislative history.
If the court had perused the Congressional debates and reports, it would
have found that thirty years before, when Congress debated the Act,
Congress had not anticipated this problem and there was no discussion of
a directness test.
1 42
139. 392 F.2d 21 at 22.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (B) (1964).
141. See note 133 supra.
142. See generally C. DUNN, supra note 6.
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If one purpose of the definition of drug is to delineate the jurisdiction
of the Food and Drug Administration and if the FDA is supposed to
regulate those products used in the diagnosis, etc. of disease to insure that
such articles are safe for use, what possible legislative purpose could be
served by excluding those articles which are used in an indirect manner?
If it is important that antibiotics maintain proper potency and sterility,
then it must be equally important that all precautions are used to insure
the use of the most appropriate antibiotic. If the Congressional intent in
enacting antibiotic drug certification was to guarantee more effective use
of the so-called "wonder drugs," it is a perversion of the purpose to deny
FDA regulation of the article used to select the drug-an essential step
in antibacterial therapy.
The Sixth Circuit states that the "evidence affords no basis for the
conclusion that the definition of 'drug' in [21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1964)]
was intended by Congress to extend beyond the meaning of that term in
medical science. . . .""' If Congress had intended the definition of drug
in the Act to be co-extensive with the medical definition of drug, there
would have been no need to specify a definition of drug in the Act. It
seems far more reasonable to conclude that Congress took the trouble of
spelling out a definition of drug in the Act because it intended the
definition of drug to mean something other than the medical definition of
drug.
The court distinguishes those cases which held such substances as
honey, 4' mineral water, 5 cigarettes, 4 ' peppermint tea leaves.. and hu-
man bloodl"s to be drugs by first quoting the statutory definition of drug
with emphasis on the phrase "intended for use." It then reasoned:
In holding honey, mineral water, cigarettes and peppermint
tea leaves to be drugs, the courts based their opinions on the
fact that by advertising these products as possessing therapeutic
and medicinal powers, such products were 'intended for use' as
drugs and hence within the statutory definition. Whole human
blood which may be used in human blood transfusions clearly
comes within the meaning of the statute. [Footnotes omitted.]'-"
143. 392 F.2d at 23.
144. United States v. 250 Jars ...U. S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208
(E.D. Mich. 1963), aff'd, 344 F. Supp. 288 (6th Cir. 1965).
145. Bradley v. United States, 264 F. 79 (5th Cir. 1920).
146. United States v. Forty-six cartons . .. Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336
(D.N.J. 1953).
147. United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
976, rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 927 (1957).
148. United States v. Calise, 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
149. 382 F.2d at 23.
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All of these cases are distinguishable, but not on the intended use
rationale used by the court. Sensitivity discs are advertised and intended
for use as laboratory reagents. Their intended use is to determine which
of several antibiotics is the proper one to use in the cure, mitigation and
treatment of certain diseases. The labeling of the disc states that it has
certain powers though not powers to aid in therapeutic treatment."'
By sticking to its medical definition of drug, the court could have
distinguished the "Bacto-Unidisk" from the other articles because it is
not eaten, drunk, smoked or transfused into or onto the human body.
While such a distinction is not suggested by the statute, at least it would
have been consistent with the earlier portion of the opinion.
At this point, it should be noted that the Act does not define a drug
to be the treatment or cure; it need only be an article used in the treatment
or cure of disease."' Many items commonly thought of as drugs (and
which are drugs within the definition of drug contained in the Act) are
not in and of themselves a treatment but are used in the treatment of
disease. Some everyday examples are: aspirin, which does not treat any
disease but is used in the treatment of arthritis because it relieves pain
so that stiffened joints may be moved more freely; anesthetics, which do
not cure anything but are used in surgical treatment of disease; and
tranquilizers, which are not a cure or treatment but are used in the treat-
ment of psychiatric disorders. By the same reasoning an antibiotic
sensitivity disc, which is not a cure or treatment of disease, is used in the
treatment of infection by indicating the relative susceptibility or resistance
of organisms to antibiotics and in this manner enables the physician to
make a rational choice of the appropriate antibiotic for use in treating the
disease.
The Sixth Circuit would have been well advised to follow the
AMP case"' because the Second Circuit's reasoning in that case applies
with equal validity to antibiotic certification. In enacting the certification
150. The labeling states that "Bacto sensitivity discs are especially valuable in
selecting the drug effective against chronic or persistent infections refractory to primary
therapy," and that they "are recommended as a rapid, practical, clinically accurate and
inexpensive means of determining the relative sensitivity of microorganisms to these
therapeutic agents." Label of Bacto-Unidisk, Joint Appendix at 143a.
151. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (B) (1964).
152. AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 825
(1968). The AMP case was decided by the Second Circuit on Feb. 13, 1968 and appeared
in the Federal Reporter dated April 29, 1968. The Bacto-Unidisk decision, handed down
on March 29,, 1966, does not mention the decision. Perhaps this oversight resulted from
the neglect of counsel to provide the court with a pre-publication copy of the Second
Circuit's opinion. However, failure to cite and to distinguish the trial court opinion in
the AMP case which was decided September 29, 1967, and which appeared in the Federal
Supplement dated January 13, 1968 (275 F. Supp. 410 (1968)) must be attributed to
inexcusable neglect on someone's part.
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requirements for antibiotic drugs, Congress did not intend to exclude
those antibiotic drugs impregnated into a piece of cardboard because they
might be deemed devices. Because Congress did not foresee the develop-
ment of antibiotic sensitivity discs, it did not contemplate their status.
However, to further the congressional purpose of insuring safe and uni-
form antibiotics, sensitivity discs should be included in the certification
program. To include otherwise would be to put the physician in the
anomolous position of knowing that those antibiotic drugs he pre-
scribes for treatment come from a batch which has been tested for purity
and potency without being certain that the drug he prescribed is the
proper one.
Even if the Sixth Circuit were unwilling to adopt the policy-oriented
approach of the Second Circuit, there was a technical alternative available
to the court which would have allowed it to further the Act's health
protection aims without flatly stating that the trial judge erred. Reliance
upon the forgotten fourth part of the definition of "drug" might have
provided the solution to the court's dilemma. "Articles intended for use
as a component of any articles specified in [the first three definitions]
are drugs."' 3 From this definition the court could reason as follows:
There is no question that each of the articles impregnated into the disc is
a drug. No one would question that penicillin, sulfadiazine, tetracycline
or any of the other articles, are by themselves drugs. Furthermore, it is
the drugs that do the work of providing information as to which drug is
the proper therapy. Therefore, rather than consider the drugs as com-
ponents of the disc, it is the cardboard disc which should be characterized
as a component of the drugs. Certainly it is a more appropriate and a
more logical interpretation of the statute to conclude that the active
ingredients, the drugs, are the "article" and the inert cardboard is merely
a component of the drugs.
153. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (1) (D) (1964).
The FDA has taken the position that the entire antibiotic sensitivity disc is a drug;
therefore, the disc must be certified. WVhile this reasoning makes sense, it is unnecessary
to the FDA's certification program. The FDA could have relieved its attorneys of having
to create arguments for the proposition that antibiotic sensitivity discs are drugs within
the meaning of the Act merely by taking the position that each of the antibiotics im-
pregnated into the disc is a drug and each of the antibiotics must be certified. No one
could argue persuasively that penicillin is not a drug. Nor could a manufacturer argue
convincingly that penicillin ceases to be a drug merely because it is impregnated into
some cardboard. The FDA would then certify each of the antibiotics separately and if
one of them failed to meet the requirements for certification, it could not be shipped in
interstate commerce. An effective certification program could be accomplished by
certification of individual component antibiotids because failure of one antibiotic drug
to pass the potency tests would stop the interstate shipment of the entire disc. In order
for the disc to be shipped, each antibiotic drug would have to meet the certification
requirements. Thus, individual certification would have avoided the semantical problems
and accomplished FDA's health protection goals.
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As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court in an eight to
one decision reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit and upheld the
Secretary's construction that antibiotic sensitivity discs are drugs."'
*Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren characterized the case as a
"definitional controversy" and without criticizing the opinion of the court
below, the court made it clear that this was a legal, not a medical question:
Viewing the structure, the legislative history, and the remedial
nature of the Act, we think it plain that Congress intended to
define 'drug' far more broadly than does the medical profession.
Furthermore, the legislative history, read in light of the statute's
remedial purpose, directs us to read the classification 'drug'
broadly, and to confine the device exception as nearly as pos-
sible to the types of items Congress suggested in the debates,
such as electric belts, quack diagnostic scales, and therapeutic
lamps, as well as bathroom weight scales, shoulder braces, air-
conditioning units, and crutches."'
The court throughout the opinion restated the Congressional intent
to protect public health. In its concluding paragraph, the court stated:
In upholding the Secretary's construction of the Act, we are not
unmindful of our warning that 'In our anxiety to effectuate the
congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must take
care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point
where Congress indicated it would stop.' 62 Cases of Jam v.
United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951). Our holding here
simply involves an obvious corollary to that principle, that we
must take care not to narrow the coverage of a statute short of
the point where Congress indicated it should extend." 6
This decision allows the continued governmental certification of
antibiotic sensitivity disks which is so important to insure uniformity of
potency. By basing its decision on policy grounds, the court avoided
both semantical difficulties and the confusion of the medical debate which
ensued at the trial. This method, like that of the Second Circuit in the
AMP case, is by far the most appropriate judicial approach to the drug-
device dilemna.
154. United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto Unidisk, 89 S. Ct. 1410
(1969).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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THE DILEMMA RESOLVED - PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE DESTRUCTION
OF THE PRE-MARKET CLEARANCE DICHOTOMY
The broad construction of the Act by the Supreme Court should
enable the FDA to classify any borderline objects as drugs rather than
devices; nevertheless, the solution to the entire drug-device definition
dichotomy is legislation. The FDA cannot, by its own action, require a
new device application from the manufacturer of medical devices. An
administration bill which would have required pre-clearance of certain
medical devices and set standards for others was introduced into the
House of Representatives during 1967. H.R. 10726, the Medical Device
Safety Act of 1967,' would have given the Food and Drug Administra-
tion the authority to promulgate regulations establishing standards for
the composition, properties or performance of any device other than a
device intended solely for diagnostic use. More importantly this bill would
have required pre-market clearance by the FDA of medical devices
intended to be placed in whole or in part within the human body, or in-
tended to be used for subjecting the human body to ionizing radiation
or other types of energy. The bill would have allowed the Secretary by
special order to require pre-market clearance for other devices if probable
cause existed to believe that the device was neither effective for its in-
tended use nor safe for use nor reliable under the conditions prescribed, re-
commended or suggested in its labeling. Obviously, antibiotic sensitivity
discs would not fall within the purview of the bill, thus not resolving the
disc dilemma."5 8
In addition to the Administration bill, the Nintieth Congress had
157. 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967). H. R. 10726 died in Committee.
158. H.R. 10726 § 513(a). An example of the type of device which would have to
meet the FDA's standards of safety, reliability and effectiveness under the proposed
legislation is an intrauterine birth control device. Even though this method of con-
traception is now used by about one million women in the United States, it is doubtful if
a manufacturer could establish that intrauterine devices are generally recognized among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety, reliability,
and effectiveness of such device, to be safe, reliable, and effective for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested in the labeling thereof.
Recently, a government advisory committee studied intrauterine devices for a year
concluding that while the devices are highly effective and generally safe, there should be
greater governmental regulation of their production, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22,
1968, at 7, col. 1. One of the dangers inherent in intrauterine devices is infection caused
by insertion of a non-sterile device into the uterus. Contamination may occur when the
coil, loop or bow is straightened out and placed into a tube-like inserter prior to
implantation. The committee suggested sterilization by the manufacturer and pre-
packaging so that physicians need only make minor adjustments to put the device into
the inserter as a method of procuring major public health protection. Absent new
legislation, the FDA is powerless to impose manufacturing or packaging requirements
upon device manufacturers. The usual remedies used by the FDA if an article is mis-
branded or adulterated are unavailable if the FDA's only complaint is that there might
be a better way to manufacture or package the articles.
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before it a bill which would have emasculated the Medical Device Safety
Act of 1967. The National Medical Devices Standards Commission Act
would have established a presidentially appointed commission of twenty
members, consisting of four each from private industry, university or
private laboratories, the private practice of medicine, government
agencies and Congress. The commission would have (1) reviewed
minimum standards and quality controls used in the manufacturing of
medical devices to determine the need for federal regulation; (2) advised
on manufacturing practices and standards; (3) established methods for
determining minimum performance standards for the manufacture of
medical devices; (4) established methods for determining the medical
value of devices manufactured; and (5) recommended to the President
and to the Congress feasible methods for federal regulation."9 The
commission would have operated as a federal agency for no longer than
five years with the authority to hold hearings, employ staff personnel and
enter into contracts or agreements to make grants for studies and surveys
with public and private organizations and institutions.
The most obvious objection to the proposal was that it called for
studies, surveys, reviews and recommendations for five years during
which action could not be taken. But even assuming, arguendo, that it
would be useful to have a commission study medical device standards, the
proposed composition of the Commission is such as to guarantee inaction
and a paucity of constructive suggestions. Only four of the twenty
members would be chosen from government agencies concerned with the
protection of public health, whereas twelve of the members would be
chosen from the private sector of the medical device industry, an industry
which has inherent antipathy to and distrust of government regulation.
Presumably the four members of Congress would have no definite bias
one way or the other. However, even if the four Congressional members
were pro-regulation, they would have neither the time nor the expertise
to offset the overwhelming anti-regulation character of the majority of
the Commission.
The National Medical Devices Standards Commission would be a
do-nothing Commission providing an obstacle in the path of any attempts
at effective medical device legislation for five years. Furthermore, the
bill discounted completely the ability of the FDA to establish regulations
in this field as it has previously done in numerous other fields of equal
complexity. It likewise ignores the procedural statutory safeguards fol-
lowed by the FDA in promulgating regulations. Under the existing law
a regulation is first proposed and published after which interested parties
159. H.R. 6165, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967). H.R. 6165 died in Committee.
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may comment orally or in writing.16 After all comments have been
received, the Secretary acts upon the proposal by publishing an order
which is the regulation.' At that time any person who will be adversely
affected by the order may file objections specifying with particularity
the objectionable provisions, stating grounds and requesting a public
hearing on the objections.6 - The objections operate to stay the effective-
ness of the provisions of the order objected to. 3 As soon as possible after
such request for a public hearing, and after due notice, the hearing is
held. 6 At the hearing any interested person may present evidence
relevant and material to the issues raised by the objections. 6 ' After the
hearing the Secretary publishes an order based on substantial evidence in
the record of such hearing. 66 In case of actual controversy, any person
who will be adversely affected by an order may file a petition for judicial
review of the order with a United States Court of Appeals for the circuit
160. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1) (1964). Such a proposal may be made by either the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare or by any interested person.
161. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1) (1964). It has been held that publishing both the
proposal and the order in the Federal Register is sufficient notice to an interested party.
Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860,
rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 945 (1950).
162. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (2) (1964). A complaint must allege that a person may be
adversely affected by the regulation. Such an allegation was held sufficient where the
petitioner and his family were consumers and it was claimed that allowing the vitamin
content of oleomargarine to be supplied by synthetic sources, under an order by the
Federal Security Administrator, would adversely affect him and members of his family.
Read v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Washington State Apple Advertis-
ing Comm'n v. Federal Sec. Adm'r, 156 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1946) (apple grower failed to
show that he would be harmed by a harmful residue left on fruit since he failed to state
there was any residue on his fruit).
163. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (2) (1964). The Secretary then publishes notice of any
provisions which have been stayed.
164. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (3) (1964). Notice of the public hearing must be sufficient.
See Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943) ; Willapoint
Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949) ; United States v. 3 7/12 Dozen Pack-
ages of Nu-Charme Perfected Brow Tint, 61 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. La. 1945). A party
is entitled to a public hearing only after filing of objections, stating grounds therefor,
and requesting a public hearing. In order to be effective to necessitate a hearing, the
objections must be legally adequate so that, if true, the order complained of could not
prevail. Dyestuffs & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fleming, 271 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959) ; cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (3) (1964), although relevant and material evidence is
required in a hearing it is not reversible error to receive immaterial, irrelevant, or
hearsay evidence as long as the order is not based solely on this evidence. Willapoint
Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949).
166. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (3) (1964). The order of the Secretary must set forth
detailed findings of fact. The findings must be based on evidence with sufficient
"rational probative force" to support the Secretary's judgment. Federal Sec.
Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943). The findings cannot be based on
hearsay evidence or mere guess, conjecture, or chance, Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), but substantiality of the evidence is to be determined in the
light of all that the record relevantly presents. Cream Wipt Food Prod. Co. v. Federal
Sec. Adm'r, 187 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1951). An order cannot become effective for at least
ninety days after the hearing.
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wherein the adversely affected party lives or has his principle place of
business." The court of appeals has jurisdiction to affirm the order or
set it aside in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently, 8' or the court
may order the Secretary to hear additional evidence if there are reasonable
grounds for failure to adduce such additional evidence at the hearing. 6 '
Thus, there is little danger that the FDA would arbitrarily or capriciously
set up standards which could, as feared by the bill's author, Congressman
Reineke, "seriously limit and hinder advanced research somewhere in
the country."17
Beyond the usual safeguards against administrative abuse of dis-
cretion was the explicit command of the Medical Device Safety Act of
1967 to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the Develop-
ment and consideration of proposals for the issuance of standards for
therapeutic devices: to invite appropriate participation by "informed
persons representative of scientific, professional, industry, and consumer
organizations that in his judgment can make a significant contribution
to such development."' 1 The proposed Medical Device Safety Act would
also have established an Advisory Council on Devices consisting of
"persons chosen with a view to their special knowledge of the problems
involved in the regulation of various kinds of devices . . .members of
the professions using such devices, scientists expert in the investigational
167. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (f) (1) (1964). To be an adversely affected person, a party
must show some direct adverse effect traceable with reasonable certainty to the regulation.
The adverse effect must be a result that is not only reasonably sure to follow the
enforcement of the regulation but will be "something more than nominal or highly
speculative." United States Cane Sugar Refiner's Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116, 120
(2d Cir. 1943).
A regulation of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs is considered a final agency
action which is reviewable by the courts. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967). However, there must be an "actual controversy" over the lawfulness of the order
before it will be reviewed by the court of appeal. Land O'Lakes Creameries v. McNutt,
132 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943).
168. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (3) (1964). It should be noted that the findings of the
Secretary as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. Therefore,
when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the Secretary based on the
record cannot be reversed by the reviewing court even if the court would have reached a
different conclusion as long as the findings are within statutory and constitutional
limitations. Federal Sec. Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); Reade v.
Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Byrd v. United States, 154 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1946).
169. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (f) (2) (1964). In addition, the petitioner who applies to
the court for leave to adduce additional evidence must show it is material. In Reade v.
Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953), the court would not stay the operation of an order
or require the Secretary to reopen hearing new evidence, because the Secretary had
notified petitioner that the new evidence would not change his decision and because the
court considered the case as if the record contained such evidence and a formal ruling on
the evidence.
170. 113 CONG. REc. H-1773 (Daily ed. Feb. 27, 1967) (Remarks of Representative
Reinecke).
171. H.R. 10726 § 512(b).
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use of devices and members of the general public."' 72 The precise com-
position of the advisory council was unspecified; however, it would have
been similar to the National Medical Devices Standards Commission
with the significant addition of representatives for consumer organiza-
tions, who, although they might not have impressive credentials, would
give the consuming public a well-deserved voice in decisions affecting
public health.
The real difference between the two bills was not a disagreement as
to whether private industry should have a voice in setting standards.
That was provided by both bills. The significant, albeit unarticulated,
difference concerned vesting control of setting standards. Should the
government agency charged with protecting the public from potentially
dangerous devices or the representatives of private industry who develop,
manufacture and market medical devices set standards? Self-interest in
the greater profits to be made in the absence of meaningful pre-market
clearance requirements or in the absence of potentially costly manufactur-
ing controls seems to disqualify from consideration the representatives of
private industry. While they have superior knowledge about manufactur-
ing techniques, their conflict of interest is too substantial to allow them to
wield the ultimate authority over medical device standards.
Admittedly the manufacturers who exercise above average care in
the production and distribution of medical devices welcome additional
regulation because it protects them from what they deem to be the unfair
competition of the producers who cut every possible corner to increase
profits. 3 Nevertheless, when the time came to consider the extent of
standards or pre-market clearance to be required, the duty to consumers
and the duty to stockholders would be in hopeless conflict. Far more
appropriate was the Administration bill's device of the federal agency
which has no built-in conflict of interest and which can utilize the
expertise of the manufacturers through consultation either formally or
informally.' 4
One other bill introduced during the past Congress is worthy of
note. It classified devices not generally recognized among qualified experts
172. H.R. 10726 § 707(a).
173. See A. Smith, A View from the Top-The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's
Multi-responsibilities, 23 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 203, 208 (1968); see also Louisville
Courier Journal, May 31, 1968, at A7, col. 1 (article by D. Pearson).
174. Whenever decision maldng is transferred from a government agency to a panel
of experts or any extracurricular advisory committee, the objection is frequently raised
that the panel is subject to "backstairs influence," D. Cavers, Administering that Ounce
Of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear Reactors, 68 W. VA. L. Rxv. 109, 129 (1966);
and "every type of direct and indirect lobbying," Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette:
An Inquiry Into the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetic Act,
51 CALiF. L. Rxv. 38, 45 (1963).
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as safe and effective as new devices and through the simple expedient of
inserting "or device" after drug every time the term drug appears in the
new drug section of the present act, subjected "new devices" to the
identical pre-market clearance requirements as new drugs.'7 5 For clarity,
simplicity and lack of ambiguity the proposal is praiseworthy. It has the
additional advantage of incorporating standards of pre-market clearance
which have proved workable and with which both the FDA and phar-
maceutical industry are familiar.
Despite its obvious advantages the simple solution is not the optimum
resolution of the drug-device dichotomy. The vast number of devices
which would be encompassed within the definition of new device would
be a substantial administrative burden. Since the greatest danger to
public health is from devices left in the body, devices which give off rays
or energy, or those devices for which there is probable cause to believe
they are not safe, reliable or effective for their intended use, it would be a
waste of time and money to require pre-market clearance procedures for
devices outside these categories. Also the new drug requirements are
more stringent than those proposed for devices, and some of the require-
ments, such as clinical testing, are inappropriate for many types of devices.
For these reasons the more thoughtful procedures contained in the
Administration bill are better suited to effective pre-market clearance for
devices.
Even though the FDA desperately needs some authority to keep
quacks from marketing their worthless devices as well as standards for
the many new and sometimes frightening advances made by scientists in
the medical device field, enactment of device pre-market clearance legisla-
tion was not forthcoming during the nintieth Congress. It may take a
tragedy like "Elixer Sulfanilamide" or Thalidomide to arouse sufficient
interest for enactment of medical device legislation; but someday lawyers
will no longer be able to spend innumerable hours exercising their
ingenuity by conjuring up differences between articles and contrivances
and otherwise dissecting the definitions of drugs and device. In this case
the lawyer's loss is the public's gain-for the first time since devices were
placed within the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act thirty years
ago they will be subject to much the same rigid scrutiny as drugs.
175. H.R. 2135, Sec. 4, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967).
